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Abstract
Many terror attacks occur at the beginning of electoral terms. We present a game
theoretical model with incomplete information to account for this empirical pattern.
Both terrorists and governments can be of weak or strong types. We nd that the risk
of terror attacks is highest at the beginning of electoral terms, because striking early
allows the terrorists to collect valuable information about the governments type,
and also because terrorists know that even initially weak governments sometimes
retaliate to show toughness closer to an upcoming election. The models predictions
are consistent with anecdotal evidence.
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1 Introduction
Many terror attacks occur shortly after a new cabinet enters into o¢ ce, while the middle
of electoral terms is usually characterized by less terrorism.1 Famous examples of attacks
early in electoral terms include the 9/11 attacks in 2001 in New York and Washington, DC,
eight months after George W. Bush moved into the White House, and the 7/7 bombings in
London in 2005, one month after Labours electoral victory.2 Also the Beslan school hostage
crisis in September 2004 occurred shortly after the beginning of Vladimir Putins second
electoral term, while the Paris metro bombing in July 1995 took place two months after
Jacques Chirac was elected French president. Similarly, Al-Qaedas attempts to explode a
plane from Amsterdam to Detroit in December 2009 and to detonate a car bomb on Times
Square in New York City in May 2010 occurred early in Barak Obamas presidency.
This pattern becomes also apparent from Figure 1 which displays ETA terrorism in
Spain, using data from the Global Terrorism Dataset (GTD 2009) and ITERATE (Mick-
olous, Sandler, and Murdock 2007) and covering the period from January 1995 to December
2006. During this period, three elections took place. ETA terror attacks tend to surge af-
ter the elections, when a new government or a new cabinet enters o¢ ce. The situation
is similar for Israel, as displayed in Figure 2 (using again data from GTD and ITERATE
for the same time period). In Israel terrorism tends to surge as well at the beginning of
electoral terms, especially in the case of Ariel Sharons and Ehud Olmerts entry in o¢ ce.
In the present paper we want to explain this empirical pattern using a game theoretical
model with incomplete information about the types of governments and terrorists. This
model predicts that attacks are more likely earlier in an electoral term. Early attacks lead
to greater benets for the terrorists as they help to acquire valuable information about
the governments type, i.e., about how inclined the government is to ght terrorism. An
extended version of the model further shows that early attacks are more likely also because
1While in the middle of electoral terms the likelihood of terror attacks seems low, this probability could
rise again right before new elections. Such attacks may be motivated by the desire to a¤ect electoral
outcomes. As this mechanism has already received quite some attention in the literature (see below), we
focus mostly on the di¤erences between the beginning and middle of electoral terms, but will still study
the governments electoral motives in an extension.
2Although Tony Blair remained Prime Minister, the start in o¢ ce of a new cabinet represents at least
partially a new beginning, given that the e¤ective power structures and constraints change after each
election.
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even initially weak governments may sometimes react aggressively to attacks later in their
terms to show toughness to the voters.
In recent years there has been a growing literature on terrorism (see, e.g., Krueger and
Maleckova 2003; Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justesen, and Klemmensen 2006; Enders and Sandler
2006; Shughart 2006; Rohner and Frey 2007; Azam and Thelen 2008; Frey, Luechinger, and
Stutzer 2009; Krieger and Meierrieks 2010; Basuchoudhary and Shughart 2010). Only a few
contributions, however, link terrorism to elections or government characteristics. Berrebi
and Klor (2006), Bali (2007), Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin, and Mierau (2008) and Montalvo
(2010) study how terrorist attacks a¤ect electoral outcomes.3
Bueno de Mesquita (2005) analyzes how governments can a¤ect the level of modera-
tion or extremism of terrorist organizations, and Siqueria and Sandler (2007) and Bueno
de Mesquita (2007) show that elections can result in too few (proactive) countermeasures
against terrorism. Pape (2003) argues that suicide terrorism is motivated by the willing-
ness to obtain (territorial) concessions, and nds that democracies which are viewed as
softare more likely to become targets. In Frey and Rohner (2007) and Crettez and De-
loche (2010) governments can signal determination by committing to reconstruct destroyed
cultural monuments.
While these contributions link government behavior and terrorism, the timing of terror
attacks is an issue that has been largely ignored. One exception is the empirical study of
ETA terrorist attacks by Barros, Passos, and Gil-Alana (2006), who nd that ETA attacks
increase in summer, but decrease with deterrence, repressive political governments, and
political accords. To the best of our knowledge, the question why more terror attacks tend
to occur shortly after elections rather than later in the electoral term has not yet received
any attention.
Methodologically, our framework builds on earlier work on reputation and imperfect
information by Kreps and Wilson (1982), and its application to protests by Buenrostro,
Dhillon, and Wooders (2007). But while these contributions assume that there is a new
potential attacker (e.g., a new potential entrant or a new protest group) in every period,
3Karol and Miguel (2007) show that the US casualties in Iraq negatively a¤ected the votes obtained by
George W. Bush in 2004.
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we assume that the same terrorists can attack repeatedly.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The model is presented in section
2 and solved in section 3. Section 4 extends the framework to account for electoral motives
of the government. Section 5 discusses the results, and section 6 concludes.
2 The model
There are two players, the government G and the terrorists T . Each player is either weak
(w) or strong (s). Hence, G 2 fGw; Gsg and T 2 fTw; T sg. The probability that the
government is strong is  2 (0; 1); and the probability that the terrorists are strong is
 2 (0; 1). The types of G and T are independently drawn. Each player can observe only
their own type, but  and  are common knowledge.
The game lasts for two periods, the rst one representing the beginning of the govern-
ments term and the second one later in the term. In each period t 2 f1; 2g, a sequential
game is played. The terrorists move rst and choose between attacking (a) and not attack-
ing (n). When they attack, the government has the choice between defending/retaliating
(d) and not retaliating (c). When they do not attack, the government does not move in
the given period.
Net payo¤s (total gains minus costs) are as follows: Terrorists of type Tw(T s) get
0 if they do not attack; Aw(As) if they attack and the government does not retaliate;
and Bw(Bs) if they attack and the government defends. We assume As > Bs > 0 and
Aw > 0 > Bw. These assumptions imply that all terrorists benet if the government
does not retaliate, e.g., because they are motivated by political (or territorial) concessions.
Strong and weak terrorists however di¤er in that strong terrorists benet from attacks even
when the government defends, e.g., because they use terror attacks to increase support for
their cause, while for weak terrorists the costs outweigh the benets of a terror attack when
the government defends.4 A government of type Gw(Gs) gets 0 in the absence of an attack;
Cw(Cs) if there is an attack and it does not retaliate; and Dw(Ds) if there is an attack
4See, e.g., Pape (2003), Rohner and Frey (2007), and Gould and Klor (2010) for an assessment of the
motivations of terrorists and their gains from attacks.
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and it defends. We assume 0 > Ds > Cs and 0 > Cw > 2Cw > Dw. These assumptions
imply that the government always su¤ers when attacked. A strong government, however,
is better o¤ retaliating than not retaliating, while retaliating is considerably more costly
than not retaliating for a weak government. For simplicity we abstract from discounting.
To illustrate the game, we show the game tree for period one in Figure 3, where N stands
for Nature, and where dotted lines connect decision nodes that are in the same information
set.
The solution concept employed is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). We denote by
 the terroristsbeliefs that the government is strong, and by  the governments beliefs
that the terrorists are strong. The optimal strategies of strong terrorists and a strong
government are independent of their beliefs: Strong terrorists always attack, and a strong
government always defends. Hence we focus on the equilibrium strategies of weak terrorists
and a weak government.5 We thereby assume that weak terrorists attack when indi¤erent,
and that a weak government defends when indi¤erent.6
3 The equilibrium
We solve the model through backward induction and rst analyze the period two subgame:
Lemma 1 In period two, a weak government does not retaliate when attacked, and weak
terrorists attack if and only if   , where   AwAw Bw 2 (0; 1).
Proof It follows from Cw > Dw that Gw plays c when T plays a in t = 2. Tws expected
payo¤ in t = 2 is thus B
w + (1  )Aw when playing a, and 0 when playing n. Hence
Tw plays a if and only if B
w + (1  )Aw  0,   . It follows from Aw > 0 > Bw
that  2 (0; 1). 
Lemma 1 implies that a weak government has no incentive to defend in the absence of
strategic motives, and that weak terrorists attack in period two if and only if they believe
5By focusing on the weak types, we follow Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Buenrostro, Dhillon, and
Wooders (2007).
6These tie-breaking rules ease the exposition by excluding mixed strategy equilibria. In Appendix B we
drop these tie-breaking rules, and we show that there still exists no PBE in which a weak government mixes
between retaliating and not retaliating, and that PBE in which weak terrorists mix between attacking and
not attacking are non-generic.
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that it is relatively likely that the government is weak.
Next, we analyze the whole two-period game. We start with a negative result:
Proposition 1 There exists no PBE in which a weak government defends when attacked
in period one.
Proof Suppose there were such a PBE. Then Tw would play n in t = 1 because 0 > Bw,
and Gws strategy in t = 2 is independent of its belief  (see Lemma 1), and T
w cannot
learn Gs type by playing a. Hence, when a is played in t = 1, Gs belief is  = 1. But
given this belief, Gw does not want to play d because Cw > Dw, and because T s plays a
anyway in t = 2. 
Proposition 1 implies that reputational concerns cannot lead a weak government to
feign strength. A weak government has no incentive to blu¤ and to defend when attacked
early in its electoral term, because it knows that only strong terrorists would attack in this
case, and because strong terrorists attack anyway again later in the term. This proposition
is in stark contrast to the results in Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Buenrostro, Dhillon, and
Wooders (2007), where a weak monopolist or a weak government may feign strength. This
di¤erence arises because the same terrorists can decide repeatedly to attack in our model,
while Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Buenrostro, Dhillon, and Wooders (2007) assume that
there are di¤erent potential entrants and protestants in every period. It follows from
their analysis that a weak government may also make a show of strength in our model if
tomorrows terrorists are likely to be weak even when todays terrorists are strong.
We now turn to our main result:
Proposition 2 There exist the following PBEs:
(i) If    , where   2Aw
2Aw Bw 2 (0; 1), weak terrorists attack in period one, and a
weak government does not retaliate in any periods when attacked. Weak terrorists attack
again in period two if and only if the government did not retaliate in period one.
(ii) If  >  , weak terrorists do not attack in any period, and a weak government does
not retaliate in any periods when attacked.
There does not exist any other PBE.
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Proof See Appendix A.
Proposition 2 suggests that weak terrorists, knowing that a weak government will not
retaliate, attack in period one only if the government is su¢ ciently likely to be weak. There
are two reasons why it is worthwhile for them to launch an attack. First, they may well
obtain political concessions from a government that does not retaliate. Second, they will
learn the governments type, which is valuable information. Later in the term, they will
attack again only if the government did not retaliate (thereby revealing its weak type). But
if the government showed strength by defending, weak terrorists prefer not to provoke
the government and refrain from future attacks.
It follows from Propositions 1 and 2 that:
Corollary 1 The ex ante probability of a terror attack is in any PBE weakly higher in
period one than in period two.
Proof If    , the ex ante probability of an attack is 1 in t = 1 and +(1 )(1 ) < 1
in t = 2. If  >  , the ex ante probability of an attack is  in both t = 1 and t = 2. 
Hence our model predicts that terrorists have incentives to attack early in the electoral
term, which is in line with the anecdotal evidence discussed in the introduction. By
striking early, terrorists can gain valuable information about the governments actions in
future periods. The terroristsability to select their utility-maximizing action in the second
period thus provides them with informational rents.
4 Extension of the model
In the baseline version of our model we assume that the governments payo¤s are the same
in both periods. However, in some cases one could imagine that governments which run for
reelection face di¤erent incentives later in their electoral term than early on. Our baseline
model may thus best capture situations in which the incumbent government cannot run
for reelection, e.g., because of binding term limits; or in which it is commonly known that
the governments stance on terrorism will not be decisive in the upcoming election.
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In this section we study an extended version of our model in which the upcoming
election could change the incentive structure that the incumbent government faces. The
situation we have in mind is one in which the outcome of the subsequent election depends
on various issues including economic performance, the popularity of the di¤erent candidates
and the governments stance on terrorism. Early in the electoral term, it is unclear whether
the governments stance on terrorism will play a crucial role in this election. Possibly
terrorism and the governments response to it become salient issues, so that the incentives
faced by an initially weak government may become very similar to the incentives of a strong
government (i.e., the pressure of the public opinion may make toughnessvery attractive).
But it is also possible that the election outcome will not depend on the governments stance
on terrorism, e.g., because the country is in a recession (boom) and the government too
unpopular (popular) to hope for (be worried about) reelection. To capture this situation,
we assume that at the beginning of period two a government that was weak in period one
becomes strong with probability  2 [0; 1) and remains weak with probability 1   . We
further assume that this is common knowledge.
Here in this extended version of our model, a government that is weak in period one
knows that it could either be weak or strong in period two. Its expected future payo¤
thus depends on Cs and/or Ds as well as on Cw and/or Dw. To derive the optimal action
of a weak government in period one, we must therefore relate Cs and Ds to Cw and Dw.
We assume that the governments payo¤ when not retaliating after an attack is the same
independently of its type, i.e., Cs = Cw. It then follows from our assumptions in section 3
that Ds > Cs = Cw > Dw. Hence the di¤erence between strong and weak governments is
that retaliation is less costly for a strong government than it is for a weak government.
It is straightforward to show that Lemma 1, which describes optimal behavior in period
two, also holds in this extended version. The terroristsbelief , however, may be di¤erent.
Further, it can be easily shown that Proposition 1 still applies. This implies that it must
again hold in any PBE that a weak government does not retaliate when attacked in period
one.
Proposition 3 In the extended version of our model, there exist the following PBEs:
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(i) If   (2 )Aw+Bw
(2 )Aw+( 1)Bw and   , weak terrorists attack in period one, and a weak
government does not retaliate in any period when attacked. Weak terrorists attack again
in period two if and only if the government did not retaliate in period one.
(ii) If  > (2 )A
w+Bw
(2 )Aw+( 1)Bw and   , or if  >  and  > , weak terrorists do not
attack in any period, and a weak government does not retaliate in any period when attacked.
(iii) If    and  > , weak terrorists attack in period one, but not in period two,
and a weak government does not retaliate in any period when attacked.
There does not exist any other PBE.
Proof See Appendix A.
Figure 4 illustrates Proposition 3 by displaying the regions of the parameter space
within which the three di¤erent types of PBEs exist. Note that there is no overlap in these
regions. This implies that there exists a unique PBE for any parameter constellation.
Proposition 3 and Figure 4 show that as long as  is small, i.e., as long as a weak
government is unlikely to become strong, equilibrium behavior remains qualitatively similar
as in the baseline version of the model, in which only PBEs of types (i) and (ii) exist. It
still holds that if  is small, weak terrorists attack in period one in the hope to get some
political concessions, and to gain valuable information about the governments type, so
that they can then attack again if and only if the government is weak. Also, it holds again
that weak terrorists do not attack in any period if  is large.
However, if  becomes su¢ ciently large, such that an initially weak government is
likely to become strong and benet from defending in response to terror attacks, then
weak terrorists will never attack in period two. They may still attack in period one, but
the threshold value of  up to which they attack in period one decreases. The reason is
that while weak terrorists may still get some political concessions, they no longer benet
from the information they can collect after the attack, as they do not want to attack in
period two anyway.
Corollary 2 follows from Propositions 1 and 3:
Corollary 2 In the extended version of our model, the ex ante probability of a terror attack
is still in any PBE weakly greater in period one than in period two.
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Proof If   (2 )Aw+Bw
(2 )Aw+( 1)Bw and   , the ex ante probability of an attack is 1 in t = 1
and  + (1   )(1   ) < 1 in t = 2. If  > (2 )Aw+Bw
(2 )Aw+( 1)Bw and   , or if  >  and
 > , the ex ante probability of an attack is  in both t = 1 and t = 2. If    and
 > , the ex ante probability of an attack is 1 in t = 1 and  < 1 in t = 2. 
Corollary 2 conrms that the main insight from the baseline version of our model also
holds in this extended version. Terror attacks are now more likely at the beginning of
an electoral term than later on, not only because there are informational advantages to
be gained by attacking early, but also because initially weak governments may sometimes
react aggressively to terror attacks later in their terms to show toughness to the voters.
5 Discussion
In this section we briey discuss how some features of our theoretical model relate to the
empirical ndings in the literature.
Our model assumes that terrorists are rational and attack only if the expected value of
engaging in terrorism is larger than the expected value of abstaining from attacks. This
is in line with the evidence presented by Pape (2003) and Gould and Klor (2010). They
both nd that the use of (suicide) terrorism can help terrorists to obtain concessions.
An important prediction of our model is that when governments show determination
and strength in response to terror attacks at the beginning of their electoral term, attacks
later in the term become less likely. There is a small empirical literature on whether
showing determination and trying to deter terrorists works. This literature o¤ers several
key insights: First, protective measures can work, but may lead to substitution. Cauley
and Im (1988) and Enders and Sandler (1993) nd that installing security measures like
metal detectors can reduce future skyjackings, but may make terrorists shift to other forms
of attacks.
Second, in countries like Israel where conict and terror are endemic, it is harder to
determine the e¤ects of being tough. Jaeger and Paserman (2008) nd that Israeli retali-
ations to Palestinian terror attacks do not have a statistically signicant e¤ect on future
terror strikes. In contrast, disaggregating di¤erent types of Israeli retaliations, Zussman
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and Zussman (2006) conclude that Israels targeted assassinations of senior military mem-
bers of Hamas, Fatah and Islamic Jihad are e¤ective to curb future terrorism, while strikes
against senior political members of these organizations seems counter-productive. Accord-
ing to Iannaccone and Berman (2006), Berman and Laitin (2008), and Berman (2009) the
fact that many targets in Israel are hard, i.e., di¢ cult to destroy, pushes groups like
Hamas towards a strategy of suicide attacks. Further, these authors argue that the weak
state in Palestine creates opportunities for groups like Hamas to provide local public goods,
which enables them to obtain participation in suicide attacks in exchange for this support.
Third, being weak and making spontaneous, limited concessions (without addressing
the main grievances of terrorists) can induce further terror: Barros, Passos, and Gil-Alana
(2006) nd that deterrence and repressive governments let to less ETA terrorist attacks
in Spain.7 Pape (2003: 356) concludes that in the context of suicide terrorism, almost
any concession at all will tend to encourage the terrorist leaders further about their own
coercive e¤ectivenessand hence homeland security and defensive e¤orts generally must
be a core part of any solution.
For illustration, anecdotal evidence from several of our examples in the introduction
supports the view that governments showing determination may be able to reduce the
number of attacks until the end of their terms. For example, George W. Bushs tough
reaction after 9/11 increasing Americas defense and national security budgets and start-
ing a global war on terrorismwas followed by a period of very few fatal terror acts
on U.S. soil until the end of his mandate (as shown by the data from GTD 2009).8 Also
Tony Blairs reaction after the 7/7 bombings in London can be described as tough, e.g.,
MI5s funding has about doubled since then (Intelligence and Security Committee 2009).
In line with our model there were no more terror fatalities in the United Kingdom until the
end of Tony Blairs mandate (as shown by the data from GTD 2009). Vladimir Putin also
showed determination in the aftermath of the Beslan school hostage crisis. He even para-
phrased Stalin, saying that [w]e have shown weakness. The weak ones get beaten(Time
7Repression also bears risks, especially when human rights are not respected. For example, in the
Algerian War what led probably more than any other single factor to the ultimate defeat of France
was the realisation, in France and the world at large, that methods of interrogation were being used that
had been condemned under the Nazi Occupation.(Horne 2006: 18).
8However, while attacks on U.S. soil were deterred, violence surged in other parts of the world.
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Magazine 2004). There were no further major terror attacks in Russia during Putins time
as president.9
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied how the risk of terror attacks varies over the electoral term.
Our model has featured di¤erent types of terrorists and governments and has emphasized
the impact of imperfect information on the risk of terror strikes. The main result is that
the risk of attacks is higher at the beginning of electoral terms than in the middle of
them. The two intuitive reasons are that it is often worthwhile for terrorists to strike early
in order to obtain valuable information about the type of the government, and also that
terrorists know that even initially weak governments sometimes show toughness closer to
an upcoming election. We have presented some descriptive evidence that is in line with
the predictions of our model.
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Appendix A
In this appendix we prove Propositions 2 and 3. Proposition 2 (which characterizes all
PBEs of the baseline version of our model) is a special case of Proposition 3 (which char-
acterizes all PBEs of the extended version), and these two propositions coincide if  = 0.
To save space, we present the proof of Proposition 3 only.
Proof of Proposition 3 There could potentially exist the following six di¤erent types of
PBEs in which Gw plays c in any period t in which T plays a:
1. Tw plays a in t = 1 and t = 2.
9Note that while our model implies that governments showing toughness may be able to reduce attacks
during their terms of o¢ ce, we do not argue that toughness can guarantee lasting peace.
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2. Tw plays a in t = 1 and n in t = 2.
3. Tw plays a in t = 1, and in t = 2 again a if G played d in t = 1, but n if G played c.
4. Tw plays a in t = 1, and in t = 2 again a if G played c in t = 1, but n if G played d.
5. Tw plays n in t = 1, and a in t = 2.
6. Tw plays n in t = 1 and t = 2.
In a rst step we prove that PBEs of type 1, 3 and 5 cannot exist. PBEs of type 1 and
3 require that Tw plays a in t = 2 after G played d in t = 1. Bayesian updating requires
that  = 1 after G played d in t = 1, and Lemma 1 implies that T
w plays n in t = 2 if
 = 1. Hence PBEs of type 1 and 3 cannot exist.
A PBE of type 5 requires that Tw plays n in t = 1, and a in t = 2. As Tw plays
n, G does not move in t = 1. Hence Tws belief at the beginning of t = 2 is simply
 =  + (1   ). It follows from Lemma 1 that for playing a to be optimal in t = 2,
it must hold that  + (1   )  . It must moreover hold that Tw does not want to
deviate in t = 1 when knowing that it will play a anyway in t = 2. Its payo¤ in t = 1 is 0
in a PBE of type 5, but Bw + (1  )Aw when deviating and playing a in t = 1. Hence
Tw would want to deviate unless Bw + (1   )Aw < 0 ,  > . As the two conditions
+(1 )   and  >  cannot hold simultaneously for any , a PBE of type 5 cannot
exist.
In a second step we show that PBEs of type 2, 4 and 6 can exist, and for each of these
PBEs we derive the restrictions on parameters  and  under which it exists. We denote
Tws expected payo¤ from the ex-ante perspective in a PBE of type k by (k). It holds:
(2) = Bw + (1  )Aw
(4) = Bw + (1  )[Aw + Bw + (1  )Aw] = [+ (1  )]Bw + (1  )(2  )Aw
(6) = 0
For a PBE of type 2 to exist, it must hold that (2) > (4) , Bw + (1   )Aw <
0 ,  > ; and that (2)  (6) ,   . It must further hold that Gw does not want
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to deviate and play d if T plays a in t = 1. (Lemma 1 proves that Gw does not want to
deviate in t = 2.) As Tw plays n in t = 2 regardless of Gws action in t = 1, Gw is better
o¤ playing c in t = 1 since Cw > Dw. Hence, a PBE of type 2 exists if and only if   
and  > .
For a PBE of type 4 to exist, it must hold that (4)  (2) ,   ; and that
(4)  (6) ,   (2 )Aw+Bw
(2 )Aw+( 1)Bw . Note that
(2 )Aw+Bw
(2 )Aw+( 1)Bw =  if  = 0, and that
 2 (0; 1) since Aw > 0 > Bw. It must further hold that Gw does not want to deviate
and play d if T plays a in t = 1. (Again Lemma 1 proves that Gw does not want to
deviate in t = 2.) Gws expected payo¤ is Cw + Ds + (1   )Cw in this PBE, and
Dw + [Ds + (1  )Cw] when deviating in t = 1. Hence Gw does not want to deviate if
Dw  Cw < (1  )[Ds + (1  )Cw]. As the right-hand side increases in , Gw does not
want to deviate for any  if Dw   Cw < Ds + (1   )Cw. This condition holds because
Dw   Cw < Cw follows from Dw < 2Cw, and because Ds > Cs = Cw. Therefore, a PBE
of type 4 exists if and only if   (2 )Aw+Bw
(2 )Aw+( 1)Bw and   .
For a PBE of type 6 to exist, it must hold that (6) > (2) ,  > , and that
(6) > (4),  > (2 )Aw+Bw
(2 )Aw+( 1)Bw . Note that  >
(2 )Aw+Bw
(2 )Aw+( 1)Bw , Bw+(1 )Aw <
0,  > . Hence for a PBE of type 6 to exist it must hold that  >  and  > , or that
 > (2 )A
w+Bw
(2 )Aw+( 1)Bw and   . It must further hold that Gw does not want to deviate and
play d if T plays a in t = 1. (Again Lemma 1 proves that Gw does not want to deviate in
t = 2.) As Tw plays n in t = 2 regardless of Gws action in t = 1, Gw is better o¤ playing
c in t = 1 since Cw > Dw. Hence, a PBE of type 2 exists if and only if  >  and  > ,
or  > (2 )A
w+Bw
(2 )Aw+( 1)Bw and   .
In this proof we have so far shown that there does not exist any PBE in which Gw
plays c if T plays a in t = 1, other than those listed in Proposition 3. Combined with
Proposition 1, this results proves that there does not exist any other PBE at all. 
Appendix B
In this appendix we show that the tie-breaking rules introduced in section 2 are not crucial.
It directly follows from Propositions 2 and 3 that any PBE in which weak terrorists mix
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between attacking and not attacking must be non-generic (i.e., such a PBE can exist only
if  or  happens to be exactly equal to the value of a relevant threshold, but not if this
parameter were changed by some  ! 0). Further, Lemma 1 ensures that there exists
no PBE in which a weak government mixes in period two, and the following proposition
establishes that there exists no PBE in which a weak government mixes in period one.
Proposition 4 There exists no PBE in which a weak government mixes between retaliating
and not retaliating when attacked in period one.
Proof When T plays a in t = 1, the lowest possible lifetime payo¤ that Gw achieves when
playing c in t = 1 (given that it plays its best reply in t = 2) is 2Cw, while the highest
possible payo¤ that Gw achieves when playing d in t = 1 is Dw. As 2Cw > Dw, Gw strictly
prefers c to d when T plays a in t = 1. Hence there exists no PBE in which Gw mixes in
t = 1. 
Note that Proposition 4 and its proof apply to the baseline as well as the extended
version of our model.
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Figure 1: ETA terror incidents and elections in Spain
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Figure 2: Terror incidents and elections in Israel
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